Box 53
Folder 7

Background

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In April 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) published their Final Report (Book V) which in essence faulted the CIA ~~and to some ext~~ for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its ~~[illegible]~~ attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's rationale is ~~[illegible]~~ detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized ~~that~~ their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should (have) realized ~~that~~ CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, ~~advised~~ the Warren Commission that the CIA had no

P.7 Book V

have

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000217 [evi]dence of a foreign conspiracy?

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect" that Book V ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posited in the
SSC Final Report. However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow response to the Warren Commission's quest for all possibly relevant information. ["Relevancy" is, of course, the "buzzword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that: "

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time. ..... The Agency should have

p. 10 1977 ~~Final~~ Report

taken broader initiatives, ~~then~~, as well."

It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA ~~with~~ regard ~~to~~ the significance of the CIA's Castro assassination attempts to the work of the Warren Commission and to resolve ~~their~~ the parties controversy as to ~~their~~ the operations importance. ~~Rather,~~ Instead this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all ~~the~~ facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-63. Certain inferences and conclusions ~~is~~ will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivations ~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate participants in the operations.

~~Involvement~~ of ~~Organized~~ ~~Crime~~ in ~~CIA~~ Plots to ~~Assassinate~~ Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the ~~use~~ utilization of the United States organized syndicate by the ~~CIA~~ ~~to~~ attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~DDP~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.+ [1967 IG Rpt. p. ; Interim Rpt p 74; see note i.] Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate" or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim", O'Connell, who ~~was~~ the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Maheu+ ~~who~~ ~~he~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive covert operations, would be contacted to recruit~~s~~ the necessary personnel.

+[Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Interim Report]

Although Maheu and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Maheu and Rosselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1960 [Interim Report ~~p~~ p 75]

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[Comment: Maheu seems the

logical person to have thought of and contacted Rosselli for several reasons. In an Office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that", Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one John Rosselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice making machines on the Strip! Maheu reasoned that, if Rosselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

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[Comment

Confirmation of ~~our~~ the earliest Maheu-Rosselli contact is found in Rosselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959, from Maheu to Rosselli [See Rosselli write-up]

[Comment

Maheu and Rosselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1960, including Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.]

date?

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Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to discuss further details

[Inspector General Report p.26; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Inspector General's Report places the meeting at the Plaza Hotel on 14 Septem 1960, Roselli recalled that the ~~contact~~ discussions took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

[Comment
Tony de Varona admits going to NY c at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Roselli at this time or [Testimony of de Varona, that his visit had an assassination motivation] ?

p.3 ?

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, "Sam Gold", who knew the Cuban crowd".

[Comment:
The timing of the introduction of both Giancana (Gold) and Trafficante ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. According

?? to the 1967 I.G. Report, the ~~soon~~ entrance of Giancana took place (?) during the week of 25 September 1960"....
[1967 I.G. Report, p18]

In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p.76, does not ~~set~~ ~~the~~ ~~a~~ ~~date~~ for Giancana's initial appearance ~~but~~ ~~as~~ date certain although it was ~~"with"~~ "certainly prior to October 18." (p76)) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ evidence between the 1967 I.G. September date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the interview in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned that Giancana had been introduced to ~~the~~ Maheu "prior to October 18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960, and (2) ~~the~~ DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro (?) [FBI memo, dated 18 Oct 1960 from Hoover to Bissell: Interim Report, p 79]

& ??

[Comment:
Each ~~the~~ dual reasons listed in the Interim Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately ~~in the~~ below.]

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[Comment:
Although the 1967 I.G. Report ~~stated~~

that "Maheu pointed out "Sold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met ~~either~~ "Sold" or Joe", the Interim Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's ~~Senate~~ testimony and stating ~~that~~ "The Support chief, who was using the name "Jim Olds," said he had met "Sam" and Joe, once, and then only briefly [O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Interim Report p 7]

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~~Comment~~ Comment

Conflicts appear also on ~~a [illegible]~~ several ~~of~~ relatively minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Rosselli know from the beginning that ~~Maheu~~ the operation was CIA?

a) O'Connell stated that Maheu told Rosselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Rosselli testified that Maheu told him that O'Connell was CIA [Interim Report p 76

Also, footnote 1 on p. 76 indicates that Rosselli told O'Connell: "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Giancana, that "I am not kidding, I know who you work for".

The importance of Rosselli's recognition of CIA ~~as~~ ~~[illegible]~~ is that it is doubtful if Giancana and Trafficante

could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. this theme will be developed more fully below.

(2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some ... business interests of Wall Street that had ... nickel interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli, 6/24/75 pp 9, 17.)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that "4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? ..... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

If Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli and William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of Phase I, it is another example of serious discrepancies which exist between the C.I.A., Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged "surprise discovery" by Maheu and O'Connell as to the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, although it is

possible that the Senate Committee Staff overlooked the specific Miami newspaper Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included pictures of Giancana and Trafficante thus ~~[illegible]~~ graphically showing Maheu and O'Connell ~~[illegible]~~ the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Parade magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that ~~[illegible]~~ O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were delivered to Rosselli et al until approximately March 1961. ? Whatever the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Parade article. In Senate Report P.77, Ft 1

The principals in Phase I of the operation ~~[illegible]~~ also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key" role,

0002189 (Maheu, 7/29/75, p.34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assination", Roselli downplayed Giancana's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli 6/24/75, p.15) ~~All of the information also~~ Whether Roselli received a "message" from Giancana's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open for question. Roselli's Senate characterization of Giancana's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged (recruitment of) ~~description~~ ~~of~~ Giancana due to his "knowledge of the Cuban world" which the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficante(s) involvement in Phase I is even more jumbled by the available evidence. The 1967 I.G. Report and Senate Interim Report ~~say~~ states that "'Joe' identified 'Joe' to Maheu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there" (I.G. Report p.19; Interim Report, p. 77). To support the description of Trafficante as a "courier" the ~~1967 I.G. Report~~ Interim Report quotes p.19 of the 1967 I.G. Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business"

Dianne ?

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0002190 Comment

This factually unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records of other agencies. As an example, State Department files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport in Havana on October ?, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February ?, 1960. (See Trafficante File, State Dept). No records available to the Committee from INS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during the period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante recalled ~~maintained~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release from prison. (Testimony, pp 4-53, ~~Oct~~ , 1978) His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the red by mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.)

By the time of the Senate testimony of Rosselli, however, Trafficante's role had diminished to a point

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0002181 even below Giancana; he had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate conversation between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Interestingly, Trafficante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as they were being reported in 1963 by the principals.

[~~Comment~~:

The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~[illegible] to~~ with a view to contrasting ~~the~~ "courier vs interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.]

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this plan was rejected

by Giancana. In a Comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector
0002192 General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink... Trafficante (Joe: the courier) was ~~Comment~~ in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister Castro. The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests but had since lost ~~that~~ source of income and needed the money." [I.G. Report, p. 25]

Comment

The observations of the 1967 I.G. Report quoted above ~~[illegible]~~ are ~~[illegible]~~ extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill ~~of~~ proposal originated with Giancana, not the Agency; a point

 which is crucial to the final conclusions presented below.
Secondly, Trafficante is identified as ~~providing~~ having access to and providing for the putative assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent with his self-serving role description of "interpreter." His ability to recruit Orta apparently ~~is~~ was directly tied to his ~~[illegible]~~ former gambling empire associations which formed a constant pattern of conduct ~~for Trafficante~~ for all his illegal [illegible] both during and after his Cuban days. [See Trafficante profile.]

Comment

Speculation concerning Orta's role arose during the ~~[illegible]~~ Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News. Sturgis was quoted as saying, "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana)
What was disturbing to the

writers of the 1977 Report was the fact ~~that~~ Orta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's, Norman Rothman (See Rothman Profile). Coupled with Sturgis' alleged ~~Mob~~ relationships, is the allegation ~~that~~ Sturgis "had a role in ~~[illegible]~~ infiltrating the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an contact with Orta in running gambling kick backs."

A second aspect of Miskill's ~~[illegible]~~ news series concerned a claim by Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 in attempting to poison Castro, which dove tailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Giancana's electronically surveilled comments in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's." (Memo, Hoover to DCI, SAH. DDP, w/att.

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The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

p. [illegible] "It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activity..."

Additional considerations:

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been agency when CIA [illegible] plan in 1962 [illegible]

2. Syndicate operators could have had activities such as those in New York Daily News story in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation w/ Orta, it was not CIA's; could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from [illegible] in 1965 after Orta settled there.

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Neither the 1967 I.G. Report or the SSC Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency passed the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Roselli [Interim Report, p80]. The chain of custody, according to the 1967 I.G. Report ~~then~~ was for the lethal pills ~~to~~ to be delivered from Roselli to Trafficante. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February - early March 1961 [Interim Rpt. p 27; Interim Rpt p 80

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~ ~~all~~ whose memory was that the money and pills for the operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fountainbleu Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by "Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante, and the Cuban". [Interim Rpt p81] Shimon's ~~memo~~ ~~v~~ story is filled with ~~[illegible]~~ vivid details which are documented on p 82 of the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question as this account is not shared by anyone else connected with the plan ~~and~~ nor is his relationship with

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0002198 Rosselli, Giancana, or Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971 which fixed the ~~date of~~ the passage of the poison at the Fountainbleau by Rosselli as March 13, 1961 and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's story is ~~that~~ the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta could or would not attempt the poisoning, a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leaks" to Anderson and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Orta's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the general thesis of this report. Orta "lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while ~~the~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington." It would seem though, that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro [~~IG~~ 1967 IG Report p. 27]

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With the failure of Orta to produce the desired results, the project was at a standstill until, once again, Santo Trafficante assumed command. Rosselli [illegible] that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement ~~[illegible]~~ might be able to accomplish the assassination. [1967 IG Rpt, p. 29; Dulles Rpt p80.]

Comment:

The exile leader was, of course, Tony de Varona, ~~[illegible]~~ who was the subject of speculation in an FBI memorandum of 18 Jan 1961 [illegible] him with receiving financial aid from American gangsters for anti-Castro activities which [illegible] the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction ~~[illegible]~~ into the CIA mob plots, de Varona was already being funded by the Agency through the Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in CIA planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was imminent.

Further in 1960-61 de Varona was also being [illegible] by Mike McKeon whose advertising agency was ~~[illegible]~~ engaged in promoting Varona's image in collaboration with McKeon's friend

00022L0 "Chirri" or "Chillo" Mendoza (Mendoza is described in Trafficante's FBI files as a close Cuban associate.)

Completing the picture of support for Varona is the promotional efforts of the Dino and Eddie Cellini, McWillie and Lansky business associates, who were reportedly working through a Washington D.C. public relations firm, Edward K Moss and Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations and was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini benefactors with the understanding that their group would have "privileged treatment" in the Cuba of the Future". Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful" [1967 IG Report p. 30]

The Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a meeting in Miami in approximately 1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts to "educate" the American people about Castro, which may be a euphemism for anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime had settled upon de Varona, as an [proudly independent] individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~[illegible]~~ multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine turmoil. de Varona was understandably pleased to permit ~~both~~ the U.S. government and criminal syndicates to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors [see Varona testimony —]

Although de Varona has no [specific] memory of meeting Trafficante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interpreter" in several meetings ~~attended~~ of de Varona, Roselli, Benavides, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante gambling partner from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during the 1960s. Trafficante claimed that Roselli had previously recruited Gener but this appears unlikely in view of Trafficante's long-standing friendship with Gener in Cuba. and Roselli's admission to

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O'Connell that ~~Trafficante~~ Trafficante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: ~~Parallelly~~ Parallelling the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Roselli's description of Trafficante's role ~~changes~~ changed from ~~the~~ his ~~translator~~ "Courier" characterization in 1960-61 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trafficante's "interpreter" statement, is the recent interview with Diener who agrees with Trafficante's ~~Committee~~ testimony that he was an intermediary with de Varona for Roselli. ~~In~~ The net result in both instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure [~~See~~ Cf. Fonzi interview with Diener, May ? 1978 and Trafficante testimony, Oct ? 1977]

~~However, the meetings with Varona came to pass, the~~

If ~~confusion~~ ambiguity exists as to the specifics of the introduction of de Varona ~~into Phase~~ one of the Castro assassination plots, more ~~than~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Varona's ~~per~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The IG Report indicates that de Varona ~~attempted~~ a second poison ~~run~~ before the ~~Cuban~~ invasion ~~that~~ Roselli was positive that only one

attempt, (Ortas) was made. He was also positive that he

0002203 delivered ~~both~~ pills, money and supplies to de Varona which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~[illegible]~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating "that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that ... (de Varona) was the contact in the United States who arranged for ... [Orta] ... to administer the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no further way to resolve de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills from Rosselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time [See Varona transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots while continuing his post on the Revolutionary Council. However, "steps were ~~taken~~ to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective" [1967 I.G. Report, p 32]

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob ~~to assassinate Castro~~, and it was not until, April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency ~~responsibility for the task~~, were ~~efforts~~ made to re-establish ~~contact~~ with Rosselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both ~~Harvey~~ and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going operation." [I.G. Rept p 33] The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discerned~~ has not been uncovered, but Rosselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Varona ~~was~~ was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mobs' motivation and

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seriousness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

First, In Phase One, Rosselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the modus operandi and the ability of the ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] assassins was deliberately vague. After ~~when~~ Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the lethal material was to be introduced into Castro's food [which involved] an asset of Varona's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." [1967 IG Rpt p.41] By June 1962 after ~~the~~ Varona had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the pills ~~into~~ Cuba, ~~the~~ "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit ~~others~~ who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned

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work for Pearson and did know that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintance with Morgan. – Morgan also tight with Pat Coyne of NSC

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their names or anything about them" [1967 I.G. Report p51]

Comment

As the 1967 IG authors correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" poisoning opportunity ~~was the same plan that Edwards~~ was familiar in "that Edwards had described precisely the same plan"; the fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

(1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or

(2) the mob had been using de Varona before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or

(3) de Varona was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime

Second

the cast of underworld

characters changed. Harvey had insisted that Maheu and Giancana be dropped from the operation which Roselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's "interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names Baccalony and Godoy.

Comment

"Maceo's" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history without any attempt made by the Agency to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely "to bed" with two of the top mobsters in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes Maceo as "Roselli's man," it is probable that this individual was drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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000[illegible]8 The termination of the CIA-
? mafia was plots slow and undramatic
Roselli, in May 1962, reported to
Harvey that the pills and guns which
had been delivered to Varona in Miami
in April had arrived in Cuba, and an
unidentified three-man team had been dispatched
in June to execute the plans [I.G. Report
p84]

During September 1962, ~~was~~ Roselli
? related to Harvey that de Varona ~~was~~
readying a second three-man team
who were "supposedly militia men
whose assignment was to penetrate
Castro's body guard. During this period,
the 'medicine' was reported as still in
place and the three men of the first
team safe [1967 I.G. Report, p51]
However, the second team never
made Cuba and a series of alibis
were constructed during December and
January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona
supposedly collected $2700 for the maintenance
of these individuals from Roselli
who had received the payment from
Harvey. [1967 I.G. Report p52]

In mid-January 1963 both
Harvey and Roselli agreed that "nothing
was happening and that there was
not much chance that anything would
happen in the future" [1967 I.G. Report p52]
Roselli was instructed to ease
his way out of touch with
Varona which he presumably did.
The last meeting between Harvey

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and Rosselli occurred in Washington D.C. on June 1963. when he was Harvey's ~~guest~~ ~~for~~ overnight guest. However their meeting ostensibly was not directly related to any assassination plots.

CONCLUSION

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The available evidence suggests ~~that~~ the thesis which, in part, is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way... In a ~~sense~~ sense, CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 IG Rpt p. 108]

?

The relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Giancana ELSUR:

"...Giancana reportedly assured those present ~~that~~ Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions... Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro." [1977 IG Rpt p. 19]

Comment

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Although the dates of reported meetings between Maheu, Roselli, and Giancana

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are subject to different interpretation, it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties ~~by~~ until sometime after October 18, 1960 the date of the FBI's intercepted conversation of Giancana.

The poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February-early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Giancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its own poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro's to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer its support. The mob was then in a perfect position. If their ~~[illegible]~~ private plot actually worked and Castro died, then the Syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against ~~the~~ CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their ~~plot~~ intrigue back-fired, then their position ~~is~~ would be that ~~they~~ were only attempting to execute the wishes of their Government.

Additional Comment

The activities of Giancana's "hired hand", Richard Cain ~~can~~ not ~~be~~ raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission

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to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Giancana's payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the agency~~ the CIA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community ~~is~~ appears a little more than ~~[illegible]~~ coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (~~and~~ one story), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-President Prio (second story) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Giancana to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain could be the "assassin-to-be" whom Giancana referred to in the FBI [illegible] of Oct 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[Tie in memo on Cain with Salinas' view which is ~~sg~~ strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of Oct 30, 1960. Maheu needs to be questioned on this point]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directorate in Chicago to that office of the Agency. Interestingly, Cubela

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was the former head of the Directorio in Cuba where he was a major ~~power~~ in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture" ~~which~~ a directive which is subject to several interpretations including the fact that the CIA was a witting participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain now the chief investigator for Cook County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in Sept 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the assassination rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of the ~~[illegible]~~ potential Assassin(s)

In describing the putative poisoner, Orcancana spoke of a "girl" who in October 1960 was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Orancana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit ~~a~~ ~~[illegible]~~ one of Castro's Cuban mistresses due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gaming and prostitution circles

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It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman, and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arrive at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McLaney) unescorted on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young women to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has been previously discussed. However, one interesting point is that she was also Charles Tourine's mistress and thus could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative and Lorenz was not asked about her relationship with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment

Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangsters' contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former receipt of gambling "kickbacks."

One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the assassination plans. According to the [illegible] IG Report (page 28)

Orta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 26 Jany 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Orta accepted for the pills in late Feby—early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 IG Rpt p 27]

If the mob was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his position of accessibility. ?? The other possibility also exists, i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to give to de Varona when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there exist~~ the same possibilities exist. If Harvey and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into an "ongoing operation," then it can ~~this~~ ~~they~~ be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Varona, which pre-dated the CIA participation according to the FBI memos of 21 Dec 1960, and 18 Jany 1961, had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs, with the exception

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of the CIA's participation, funding and material support could, once again be returned to the Agency although deVarona would continue to deal through his most intimate, Rosselli and "Maceo."

Due to the loose structure of Phase II in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harvey upon Rosselli's word that attempts were actually being carried out, the Agency's lack of control or ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the speculation arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence in Castro's Cuba. Being skilled businessmen, Trafficante, Lansky and other former Cuba casino owners must have realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, the evidence shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic and a new opportunity for bolita operations in Florida with the tremendous influx of Cuban exiles. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide-open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if Castro and all his Communist associates could be eliminated.

Despite the relatively

usual business sense in continuing the assassination attempts against Castro in a substantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along." First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was providing full logistical support for Varona. Second, there was the mounting pressure from the ~~[illegible]~~ FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted if possible. No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look at the record shows the employment of ~~[illegible]~~ this strategy ~~[illegible]~~ at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1. Robert Maheu

- Quashing of Long Committee subpoena in 1966 [Interim Report, p 79, note 3; Interview Edward P Morgan]
- solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Organization [Hughes was definitely told of the project by Maheu in Nov. 1960, and was himself interested in an alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred later when Maheu was Hughes' principal agent?] [Interim Report, p 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony?
- Dispute with Hughes; See Memo 20 May 1971 in Office of Security File on Edward P Morgan]

2. John Rosselli

- evading criminal prosecution [Interim Report, p 85, note 4.
- use in ~~[illegible]~~ legal memo in March 1971 to attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~[illegible]~~ attempt to delay deportation hearings with INS which included

0002218

Jack Anderson's personal intervention with IRS (See Anderson [struck through] and CIA Rosselli file; [struck through] CIA Office of Security file re Edward P. Morgan)

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat" for him by claiming the tap was a result of the CIA plots.

- Early 1967, intervention with FNU Farrell of INS re possible deportation [See Tab C, Rosselli CIA File, stating that Mr Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston knew]

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963 & 1967 [I.G. Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967, Sam commented that Rosselli and Giancana have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation". He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Rosselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people" (1967 I.G. Rpt p 131)

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Notes re Jack Anderson "Castro Retaliation" Theory.

0002219

March 3, 1967
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson column

Source:

1967 I.G. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients (p 120)

– We may now assume that Pearson's story is not pieced together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(p 120)

?! – Impact

The Rosselli-[circled: Giancana] contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Giancana may also know this (p 121)

– Maheu

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does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative

client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion

- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team

Comment

Not necessarily since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and only briefed Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3 man team to Maheu or O'Connell during Phase I

Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point -

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. Ep 125

Since Agency c/n figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is drinking too much and talking to Morgan who is also drinking and talking to Greenspun & [or Pearson]

Comment

Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best goodies: the story of the pills

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting. (P 127)

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Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I-G speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 62 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which was attended by Harvey. (p 112)

[RFK was not present]

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident."

[Memo in Office of Security file re Maheu.

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Untitled

Mr. Al Pease (former CIA & now with Intertel) said Maheu & Anderson together on some oil mix deals. ... Recent exposure of Anderson re Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Maheu using his son Peter, as an intermediary.

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Pease' theory is that Maheu probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (i.e. Intertel w/ ex numerous CIA staff to embarrass Hughes).

- Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement with CIA [Memo in Security File re Morgan]

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

?

- Harvey had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli conviction.

- 17 Nov 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Wadden who informed Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCI decided to ignore threat and Maheu agreed.

"Maheu further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally.

5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Series of conversations instigated by Harvey on Roselli's behalf to get CIA intervention directly or at least discover how good govt case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began in October to Harvey. Roselli knew what Agency had done for Maheu with Sen. Long because DC Morgan told

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Roselli:

- Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harvey a news clipping re Agency use of Giancana (presumably the August 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Pearson story

- Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase I operation due to Agency delaying on Long committee subpoena.

- Maheu visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maheu) had been identified as the "client" of Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes. with Roselli

? ? - Maheu denied "knowing" latter phase of program & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Hank Greenspun in the 1950s

- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Osborn in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~impression~~ impression that Roselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI -- deporting him (?) & had a 19 yr old girl

- Believed Morgan had done some

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John Hamilton SECRET
Review of Office of Security File June 6th

15 Jun 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade Cty investigator for information on 8 Cubans:

1. a. Ramon Don Esteves
b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
c. Luciano Nieves
d. Jose De La Torriente
e. Jose Quintana
f. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo
g. Manola Artime
h. AMLASH

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in Roselli (SSCI) testimony.
Two names mentioned in a 9 Dec 1970 Office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on Roselli or Giancana

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect between Roselli & Agency officials up until approx. 1971.

ix. O'Connell has already been interviewed by Dade Cty.

x. Office of Security has no such evidence that Cuban Intelligence Service may have been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area during time of his death SECRET

0002226

Nieves

c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro plot.; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station
- August 1965 entered U.S.
- Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shimon

He is mentioned on the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shimon knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

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30 August 1976 request by S/A Edward C. Rudeger, Alexandria FBI Office.
- Cuban contacts of Roselli
1. Juan Orta
Was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Orta was reportedly selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.
2. Tony Varona
When Juan Orta was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Varona be used. Roselli contacted Varona. de Varona was to use

0002227

assets of his in to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son-in-law to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the son-in-law.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known to Harvey as "Maceo", who also used the names Garcia Gomez and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Maceo, who was described as a Cuban who spoke Italian.

f. No info in regard to death or violence threats against Roselli or Cubans in C/I or Maheu, Giancana - Trafficante, Shimon, or Morgan in C/

517-339-3523

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCI decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur by the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject. Inter Tel

- Maheu had been engaged by Hughes Tool probing the Maheu efforts. Al Pease former Agency man & Intertel now, said Maheu made noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement w/ CIA.

I John Southard - in 1962-64 was on brief w/ Maheu & simultaneously working out details of a non official cover arrangement w/ Aircraft Div of Hughes Tool.

For past several Maheu had been paid ...

On May 10, 1971 Mr. Pease said Maheu & Anderson are involved together in some oil ties deals. Intertel looking into this & all other such similar matters to trace the source & disposition of funds. Recent expose by Anderson re Maheu's role in the Castro Plot was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robt Maheu using his son Peter as an intermediary. Pease's theory is that Maheu prob. thought such publicity would 'scare them off'. The Intertel staff is aware of a series of contacts & meetings between Pete Maheu and Jack Anderson or a member of his staff.

0002230 Memo 19 Nov 1970

For: DCI

Subj Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Col. Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually thru clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and controlled all of the ice making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if R was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.

6. Maheu to approach R who knew M as a PR exec. handling domestic & foreign accts.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the "Cuban crowd." No money requested or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Maheu introduced to Sam staying at the Fontainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was identified

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to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade

9. In discussing ~~the~~ possible methods of accomplishing ~~this~~ mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kick-back payments from the gambling interests, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona ... and become disaffected w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing to handle ~~the~~ mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given $10,000 for organizational expenses & $1,000 for communications

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secur urge RCR on clearance delay up to make its count in writing. At our urgent [illegible] dropped.

17. May 1962 Harry took over as Case officer & it is not known by this Office whether R was used operationally from that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967

18. 2 Dec 1968 R convicted of Fraud [illegible].

19. Harry reported to Office of Security his contacts w/ R in Nov-Dec 1967 & Jan 1968. It was his belief that Johnny w/ not solicit the Agency for assistance on deportation unless he actually faced deportation. R expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Maheu called O'Connell to advise that Maheu's attorney, Ed Morgan, had recd a call from Tom Waddin who stated appeal exhausted & R faces deportation. If someone did intercede on R's behalf, he would make a complete expose' of his activities w/ Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCI briefed & decided not to assist R. Maheu was so advised of Agency's position & he was in complete agreement w/ our stand. He further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it applied him personally.

Howard [illegible] June 18, 1971

be acting [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] team on a

SECRET

rooftop; last of Feb or first of March 1963
 March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his contact at Fontainebleau

- a few weeks later Castro ill

Feb 23, 1971
Once he called on Chi racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that G had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba". However, the Chi gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo For Record
Telephone conversation - Harry & Howard Osborn
2. The first involved Dir of Security the subject of our last lunch conversation re. J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case against him; & whether or not the Agency planned to consider any possible intervention on his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the policy of "sitting tight" might be sought, but that he felt it would be a simple matter for the Dir to see Hoover personally & determine on an unofficial, courtesy basis what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harry trying to find out validity of case for purpose of Magee
Harry to work For Magee

0002236 11 Dec 1967

1. Harry reported luncheon meetings w/ Papich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1967 R calls Harry. who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Jim Angleton & Harry intro'd R as "Mr. Ralston.

28 Nov spent 11 hours at Bethesda

4. According to Harry, Country Club. R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not named re indict. when he brought.

-R said he had not seen Giancana since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R d/n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

6. Joly told Harry re luncheon mtg w/ Col. Edwards in 1966 & being mtg O'Connell had w/ Maheu & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Far East

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, then Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the indict "killed". If it is not a good case, then Harry will tell Joly & he will make it avoid.

10. Harry indignant at suggestion his intent was anything to protect Agency

0002237

He had only the highest regard for Agency and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. Not Harry agreed to serve as R's attorney

- R wondered why Agency could not do as much for him as it did for Maheu. Ed Morgan knows what Agency did for Maheu w/ Sen. Long & had told Jolley about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quote vehement & bitter re Maheu indicating Maheu would "sell anyone down the river to protect his nonsense."

- Dor had sent Harry a news clipping re use of bananas. R said leak came from Sen. Kennedy's office when he was still AG

Exec. Dir. Maheu

28 April 67

Counsel - Mayor allegedly contacted some high-level officials in Govt indicating he had a client who had been involved in an operation against ...

Maheu recalled & said he had told Mayor when Agency delayed on Long subpoena.

2. Maheu visibly upset & told if he had been identified as client since

C0002238 publicity on his relationship w/ Hughes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 196[illegible]
& never discussed latter phases w/ R

6. Maheu - R met Morgan thru Greenspun in 1950's when Morgan doing legal work for ~~Las Vegas Sun~~.

R & Morgan in Vegas simultaneously in March. Jim Cannon in town" It was Maheu's recollection that these individuals spent some time together. He was under the impression that Johnny sought legal advice from Morgan but d/n know nature of their conversation.

7. Claimed R had difficulty w/ deputy, [illegible]; 17 yr old girl & arrested by Sheriff's [illegible] for failure to register. R putting pressure for Maheu to use his friends.

8. Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson & did know that Friedman had more than a passing acquaintance w/ Morgan.

Morgan fight w/ Pat Coyne for NSC.

9. Knows Johnny having problems w/ the FBI but d/n know details.

10. It ~~is~~ is evident that Maheu is deeply concerned about possibility of being identified w/ Castro project. but played cooperation some ~~to deny involvement~~

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J002239

Sen Long Maheu

S. Lenihan, Long's personal atty, told [illegible] that Maheu worked w/ Agcy.

7 June 66

Maheu reported by Morgan as dealing w/ St Louis atty, a personal friend of Long, re Maheu's appearance -

3. Fensterwald. had identified Sam Giancana, etc by name to O'Connell & Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed DuBois & a couple of his technicians were aware of Maheu's tie-in w/ Giancana.

31 May 1966

Maheu asked if "Sam project" was in the wind

12. Morgan had assured Maheu that he knew Long's personal atty who exerts great influence on Long. They flew to St Louis & there the 3 men flew to D.C. & met w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald wanted Maheu as his "ace in the hole" in that Maheu's clients have great appeal for T.V. Also that Maheu was not getting enough to hide behind. Unless Long says no, Fensterwald would proceed

13. Maheu claims because of [illegible]

Sam thru a series of circumstances that were planned at our request. The then A.G. RFK was orally briefed on the background that led up to Maheu's involvement & a Top Secret document furnished to Justice Dept which served as a backup of the briefing

1967 I.G. Rpt

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p3 Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Gov't attitude toward the Cuban regime

a: Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behavior or by altering his appearance

b: August 1960 to April 61

Plots aggressively pursued; viewed by at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime culminating in BOP

c: April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Aug 60 was called off after BOP & remained dormant for several mos.

d) Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of MONGOOSE

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis & collapse of Project MONGOOSE, aggressive scheme begun Aug. 60, revived in April 1962, were finally terminated in early 1963

p6 Drew Pearson column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

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a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed
b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

5. FI syndicate ~~[illegible]~~ in its own operations, tends to reinforce thought that details would have been clarified by discussion or security during FBI Oct 1960 report.

p. 8 Final Report recognizes that such plots have no relation on a precaution theory

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Ruby – Trafficante

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro or proposing such action. Three of the messages related to the same operation the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of ~~CIA~~ initiative.

AMBRONC/5 01 arrested 29 May 1962 and was executed 30 August 62. He has been reported as never admitting that he was a CIA agent. His name not given to media. Three others were

1/PV

AMLASH

C0022244

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SSC

1) inference that AMLASH a Castro agent with the mission of provoking a plot against Castro so that Castro had justification for retaliation,

or

2) AMLASH so indiscreet the details would have been known there provoking Castro

whatever, should have been reported to WC

Agency - the character of the relationships between CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to assassination [illegible] of Pres Kennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro.

.... there was little for him to report or leak".

Comment p5

Over a year passed between August 1962 and Sept 1963 when he was not contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the critical period, in is therefore between 5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963.

Reason for hiatus is that AMLASH s/n leave Cuba; he was recontacted due to his potential.

Cf p13 Final report

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0002245 Cable on Sept 7th says "AMLASH is a totally spoiled brat who will always be a control problem.

... is best approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert dev...

p Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH was viewed as potentially important, he was also viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, requiring careful but long range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue

pp 3-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, presents AMLASH as an assassination plot & inference is that Castro Sept 7th speech might have been a result of leak by AMLASH

p 10 "the fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time

Fitzgerald meeting stated he requested high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights

SECRET

14 Nov AMWHIP reported ~~that AMLASH~~ satisfied w/ policy considerations ~~but unhappy~~ over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He c/n understand why he had not been given "certain small pieces p14 of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem" . . .

Comment

In essence he (AMLASH/1) was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While ~~that~~ may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a gov't, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p 18) to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 interpreted the pitch ~~off~~ by Fitzgerald.

Cite Aug 1964 FBI Report stating that AMLASH-1 unhappy with CIA reason and R.F. Kennedy had refused to support the plan

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

0002248

could, if he requested it, include.. high-power rifles w/ scopes..

19 Nov. AMLASH tells CIA he is returning to Cuba.
Request by headquarters to ask him to delay for 1 more meeting.
AMLASH agrees "if it is something interesting"
p 19 SSC speculates that this is first indication he might receive specific support Agency - at best a piece of highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.
[Fails to mention pen w/ blacking point in the record.]

---

p 26 "A"
"unaware of AMLASH 1963 association with CIA"
His info at least 1½ years after death of JFK; no idea of 1963 CIA ties w/ AMLASH which were very incriminating

a CIA source (first in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members... The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 [illegible] of gambling rep. to a Cuban exile leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the exile leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

or "... while the events described by Drew Pearson did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unfounded."

018. "During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell & Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Maheu pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe"."

019 At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba & Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami & Havana on syndicate business.

SECRET

p.24 Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills ~~about~~ the size of saccharine tablets.

0002252

(Comment - Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival & escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Traf. (Joe, the courier) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta who was then ~~Office~~ Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister. The gangster said that Orta had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since ~~lost that~~ source of income and needed ~~the~~ money)

P27. Late Feb - March 1961

[illegible] passed the pills to Traf. Rosselli reported to O'Connell ~~that~~ the pills had been delivered to Cuban Orta. Orta is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before using them. According to the gangsters, Orta got cold feet.

SECRET

Comment Orta ~~lost~~ his position in P.M.'s

office on 26 Jan. 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami & Washington. He took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy

0002254 April 1961 ...

... It would seem tho, that the gangster did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro.

p 30. The Cellini brothers were believed to be in touch with Varona. These Mafiosi were reported to have offered Varona large sums of money for his operations against Castro, with the understanding that they would receive privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future." Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p31. Trafficante approached Varona and told him that he had clients who wanted to destroy Castro & that they would pay big money for the Commit[ment].

Roselli said as a loyal American he would do whatever he could & would never divulge the operation]

p 31. R wants to deliver money to Varona for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards remembers 25,000; Bannerman recalls $\overset{20}{25}$,000

p32 Roselli gave the pills and money to Varona, whom Roselli dealt with under a pseudonym. Little is known of the delivery channels beyond Varona

SECRET

p. 32 Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was revived April 1962, Harvey took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have received the pills, but he has no specific recollection of having done so.

p. 49. Roselli needed Gian. & Traff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Varona. However, it would be naive to assume ~~that~~ Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate)

p. 51 June 1962 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make ~~the~~ the attempt, perhaps using the pills.

SECRET

SECRET

0002256

Harry never learned their names or anything about them.

p52 Harry says Rosselli wasn't kidding himself. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p.62 RFK- I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime - with gangsters you will let the Atty General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 66. The Atty General's copy of the memorandum for the record of that briefing (7 May 62 by Edwards & Houston) is in Archives of the AG's office.

p67. Chicago Sun-Times article of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Giancana never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept drive to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his ruse of co-operation w/ another govt agency."

Article puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961

Reports Maheu bugging incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent tailing Cuban who allegedly says:

"Why don't you fellows leave me alone?

0002258 I'm one of you!"

Cuban pictured as being approached by CIA but declining

AMLASH

p79 ? - DR took Presidential Palace which they refused to surrender to Che; later did to Fidel
- Cubela believed to be one participant in assassination of Lt Col Antonio Blanco Rico, head of Batista's military intelligence
- DR quite apart from 26th of July but signed a unity pact

= "... Agency was primarily interested in keeping Cubela active in [redacted] PROM program directed against Cuban military leaders, while resisting his pleas for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and information furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cubela's case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubela's plottings."

p87 16 Sept 1963

Cubela wrote Tepedino - "I don't intend to see (be interrogated by) your friend again" which you should tell them, "so they don't

SECRET

make the trip: I want to ~~get away~~ from politics completely."

pg 2 Sandy says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced rifle w/an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

The Drew Pearson Story

a) Published Details	The Facts as we know them
Robt. Kennedy may have signed an assassination plot	Not true. He was briefed on Phase One after it was over - He was not briefed on Phase 2
b) three (3) hired assassins were caught in Havana; one still in prison	R tells Harvey on 21 June 62, that Varona says 3 men in Cuba. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof ~~that~~ they were actually dispatched. Nothing re announced captures and executions during this period fits this team

SECRET

Castro learned enough at ~~least~~ to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. He is reported to have

this reportedly has come out in the Garrison(?) investigation. It was also stated by Castillo(?) in the Philippines under ~~lie(?)~~ interrogation. We have no independent corroboration of any sort. (No that Cubela(?) met w/ Rosselli(?) in Las Vegas in March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967.

Beaubouef apparently to be used as a source of rumors to show Oswald a CIA agent & was to be used to assassinate Castro. Garrison alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain persons to work with Cubans for assass. of Castro. This memo is intended to record that such letters never existed & therefore could not be in Garrison's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain alias Robert Scully Cain / Richard Scalzetti
DOB Oct 1931 Chicago

FBI memos
- 21 Dec 1960 not funneling info
- 18 Jan 1961
identifies individuals

- Identity of WI ROGUE

- April 61 to April 62 indicates
- "something going on"
independent of Agency.

- RFK secretary called on 4 March 67
to obtain memo; already knew article
of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65
Bango in Madrid & claims group
in Cuba ready.
Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 Arrests in Cuba
Trial refers info to late fall 64 & early 65
w/ Artime meetings

SECRET

10 June 64 "Pepin" Bosch Rums approach The WH/4

SECRET

0002266

Ocampo's interview of Malone in May 19[illegible]

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SF contained in material previously cleared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib
Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain
  - Fall 1960, contact in Chicago
  - Summer 1961 Mexico City
  - April 1962 Mexico City
  - 4 June 62 deported
  - 19 Aug 63 Chicago
  - 26-30 Aug 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami
  - 12 Sept 63 DRE arms purchase
    - told to get out of picture
  - 1 May 1972 disappeared.

27 Nov 63 - Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 901 S. Spaulding under direction Michael Corley
- LHO purchased rifle March 63
- Story suspect LHO in Chicago 1963 April.

SECRET

SECRET

C002267

1. Ramon Don Estevez Dominguez
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936

2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
DOB 12 Jan 1918

3. Luciano Nieves

4. Jose de la Torriente

5. Jose Quintana
DOB 3 Oct 45 nephew of [illegible]

6. Joaquin Antonio Ortuyo DOB 10 Jan 43

Edward Pierpont Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

SECRET

TAB B

(2-9-78)

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for School of Advanced Int'l Studies & Johns Hopkins Univ.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection w/ DDO projects.

∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Resorts Int. #591 727

Wallace Groves OS file # 473 865

- assoc w/ Meyer Lansky

- Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp w/ Albert Whisant (#633 974) and John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to DeMar, Cain in Mexico 1961 into 1962

- 1964-65

SECRET

JOHN HORNBECK
9 FEB 1978

SECRET

0002269

7-Mar-35
St Paul, Minn
36 yr

Bradley Earl Ayers
Eglin AF Base Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

Cover name? Daniel B. Williams

Paragon Air Service

Zenith Technical Enterprises - south

campus of Miami U.

Rudy; Harvey, Robertson (Rip) Big Dader

Training sites

Palo Alto Key

Upper Key Largo

Card Sound on edge of Everglades

Security Approval

Date 10 Aug 1964

Reference 23826 (DDP/WH/SA

Case No. 366085

Request For Personnel Action

Serial No

366085

Nature

Separation Return to Parent SVC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations: Forward operating ~~station~~ - JMWAVE
DDP/SAS Paramilitary Branch Section II
U S Field Office ~~Reinstate~~ CRC Indep Pol Groups

SECRET

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic bearing ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Div. D, 1502 L Bldg only
- Personally approved by DD Plans

Harvey
Chief FI/Div D

19 Feb 1962

To Harvey re authorization of QJWIN for ZR RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category & by your certification

2. Salary 7500 per yr; 7500 in addition to salary

3. Memo to be considered in lieu of project & constitutes authorization for all travel per diem; operational & other expenses

4. Eyes Only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan — Roselli — Maheu — Giancana

Marchin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Anderson

1) Prior to Aug 60

2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOP)

3) April 61 to late 61

4) late 61 to late 62 (Cuban missile crisis

5) late 62 to mid 63

Roselli op started in Sept 60
(Maheu to Roselli to Giancana)

AG Briefed 7 May 62

Taylor became chairman of JCS
on 9 Aug 62

Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy,
Gilpatric, Lansdale,
Murrow, McCone

Memo For Record
Rept at request of DCI; consigned
to IG on 23 March 67
The one stayback burn copy (IG)
all notes, & other derived source material
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chief WH (Dowen)
From Dir of Security
Subject: WH/Security Project

Final accounting of monies expended on
a sensitive project of interest to DD/P, Chief WH
& Dir of Security.
Disbursements.
25 Sept 1960 thru TO Cutout 690.
6 Feb 1961

SECRET

CC02272

11 Feb 1961 TO Principal Agent 1900
31 Jan 1961
14 Feb 1961 Commo Expenses 1,043
26 Sept 1961
Hqs
12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3 IG Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crises Oct 62 & collapse of MONGOOSE, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1960 & revived in April 1962, was finally terminated early 1963.

Two other plots were originated in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them.

P ?

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) wherein McNamara broached subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

sec (c)

Result - Project MONGOOSE memo by Lansdale

31 July 64

Discussion at Special Group of a Clandestine Services memo of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. Helms & had no involvement.

missing page

P2 and Gonzalez Gallarreta and Jose Luis — Press Release 9 March 1966

—purpose of contract for intelligence & of [illegible] to [illegible] payment

—Jorge ROBRENO, Alberto BLANCO Romariz, Luis Tapedura

SECRET

Not in ~~[illegible]~~ with Dean Sloan.

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bissell ref Gianca improveable; Edwards then briefed Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Maheu called O'Connell & [illegible] about Pursuit [illegible] Gold & Joe
(Previously just [illegible]. Maheu & O'Connell knew names.)

Joe a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there accdg to Gold

Trafficante making regular trips to Havana
~~10~~ 7 Jan 59 - casinos closed
13 Jan 59 - Castro announces re-opening
17 Feb 59 - Cabinet announces opening
30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P 23 Technical Chief TSD
4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish poison to be admin w/a pin (which Cornelius Roosevelt said was supplied to Gary Powers
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
(4) handkerchief

P 29. March April 1961
Roselli told O'Connell that Trafficante knew a man high up in exile movement. (Varona)
Rpt from ~~FBI~~ suggest him Traff.

SECRET

SECRET

C002274

Moss V[illegible]:

a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro

b) 18 Jany 1961 amounts V. worth these schemes; V had hired Moss as a fund-raiser

---

CIA had interest in Moss but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

Mach (1959 [24]) for use in [illegible] Devine as consultant to Indian Embassy]

- Nov 62 by CA Staff under [illegible] Major a program for exploitation of political consultants.

Roselli to deliver $ to V. Estimates vary but Esterline says 10,000 + 1000 of communication as per Secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev. Front & heavily involved in BofP. Steps taken to end his participation in syndicate plan but apparently ineffective.

P32

People who knew:

1. O. O. - original man to [illegible]
2. A V -
3. Son-in law of HV.

SECRET

2/PV

SECRET

Phase 2

C002275

Harvey briefed by authority of Bissell in Feb 1961 in connection with a general stand-by capability for Executive action.

Harvey had already discussed problem w/ [05] (Arnold Silver) & Sidney Gottlieb—both parties probably not in to Cuba project.

Helms briefed on general concept but not on ongoing Cuba plot.

QJ WIN recruited by (Arnold Silver) [05] for use in Congo; Justin O'Donnell recruited other.

ZR RIFLE covered as a FI/D operation (ostensibly ~~to~~ develop a capability to enter safes & kidnap couriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harvey discusses application of ZR RIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell to ~~take over syndicate operation~~

Unrelated - Helms puts Harvey in charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harvey busy

Feb - March 62

- March 62 Harvey takes over Castro

- Harvey view -

came to think of Castro operation & ZR RIFLE as being synonymous.

- Exec Action as synonymous w/ QJ WIN

- ZR RIFLE ~~[illegible]~~ used to Exec Action
ZR RIFLE alone meant Castro

Harvey's interpretation

SECRET

2/PV

0002276

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing
[Personally handled Castro operation & d/n use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE]

- Memo of Harvey after he left Task Force W & going to Rome on 27 June 1963 to Chief FI/Staff that original reason for being QJ WIN no longer exists & suggesting termination.
- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show termination of d[?] Luxembourg Station on 21 April 64.
[There is no indication in the file ~~that~~ the Exec Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE / QJWIN ~~was~~ was ever used]
Edwards -
- No activity after B of P until Harvey met Roselli & re activated April 62.
- Edwards out of contact w/ RFK over McGuire wiretap
- 14 May 62 - Harvey called Edwards & indicated he was dropping Roselli from further use

p43 'Harvey - took over a "going" operation. since he described plan for getting poison to a favorite Castro restaurant the mechanics were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one I
- O'Connell thinks "something going on" between April 61 & April 62 but c/n remember

SECRET

0002277

April 8th Agency

– Harry met w/ Rosselli & O'Connell

– O'Connell positive Maheu there

/ Harry says he would have remembered Maheu; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agency; not since 52 when Harry sent to Berlin.

– Edwards deliberately did not mention Maheu when he first briefed Harvey

p45 O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to Okinawa

p47 18 April 62 O'Connell gets pills for Rosselli meeting w/ Harvey in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harvey took it over altho he cd n remember when & exact date

Harvey specified that Giancana not to be brought in for 2nd phase & believes Rosselli honored agreement.

Rosselli reptd that Giancana asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" Giancana – "Too bad"

p48 Maceo – unlikely a Varona associate named Antonio MACEO Mackle who Harvey probably would have known. Also, 1/5 clear Maceo was "Rosselli man".

Rosselli essential to 2nd phase as a contact to Varona.

SECRET

p 49. When the pills were given to [illegible] [illegible]
Varona requested arms and equipment needed for
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

V requested arms & support & Roselli
passed word to Harvey. With help
April 1962 of Shackley, chief of JMWAVE,
about 5000 of weapons & equipment.

a) explosives
b) detonators
c) 20 .30 caliber rifles
d) 20 .45 cal. handguns
e) 2 radios
g) 1 boat radar

Harvey & Shackley rent U-Haul
& put truck in parking lot for
delivery to Maceo, V, or his son in law.
Harvey & Shackley set up watch as
do Roselli & O'Connell.

Shackley not aware of plan.

p 50 May 62 - Roselli reported that the pills were in Cuba & at the
June 62 restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.

V had ~~sent~~ dispatched 3 man team to Cuba

~~Sept~~ 1962

Harvey saw Roselli in Miami on
7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team
of militia men assigned to penetrate
Castro's body guard but never happened.
"Medicine" reported ~~safe~~ still in place and first team safe

~~Sept~~ 62 - Jan 63

p 51
militia men
poised to
take off

Delay due to
a) conditions inside
b) [illegible] misc

Harvey in Miami 22 Dec - 6 Jan
& saw Roselli & Maceo several times. Gave
Roselli 2700 to V for upkeep of 3 militia
men who never left (in Fla Keys)

Feb 63

Harvey left word for Maceo in
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked
as if deal off. (Just how Harvey left this
word for Maceo is not clear)

SECRET

0002279

~~April~~ May 63
Helms approved a last meeting w/ Harvey & Roselli before Harvey left for Rome.

People who knew
055 Bruce Cheever (Harvey's deputy 1962) knew Harvey meeting w/ gangsters in Reno in winter of 62

May 62
Shef Edwards & Lawrence Houston briefed RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to prosecute wiretap case but wanted to be informed of Agency ever dealt w/ "gang-sters" again. RFK asked for a memo of the meeting via a phone call. memo prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.
NO briefing of McCone, General Carter, or Helms

RFK not told that Phase II had begun; that V had pills & arms in Cuba itself.

On 14 May 62 Harvey ~~briefs~~ Helms; advises against briefing McCone & General Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli is not going to be used

Comment
RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67 to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

of Pearson article of 7 March a.? & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helms had lunch w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He did not leave a copy.

1954-55 Maheu hired by Niarchos to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British gov't & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connell reported that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Maheu stated he might brief his attorneys on Company re past activities.

10-11 Augt 62 SECRET

03
(Wainwright) Tepedino & Cubela in Copenhagen & (Wainwright) used "assassinate" & Cubela objected 03 "eliminate" –

000229

14-23 Augt 62
03 Cubela, Tepedino, (Wainwright) 03 & (Carl Williams) from Madrid; met in Paris.
Cubela given S/W training & supplies; shown a demolition demonstration.
Refused to be polygraphed.
(Williams) 03 cabled that no physical elimination missions be given as a requirement but he might do it on his own initiative. Headquarters strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given Cubela, a.

5-8 Sept 63
Brazil - met by (Wainwright) 03 Tepedino & Nestor Sanchez who became case officer.
Cubela claimed 2 S/W messages but only 1 received. Afraid of postal censorship.
Thot highly of Ramon Guin Diaz AMTRUNK-10 who was led by Miguel DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) who had been sent to recruit GUIN

SECRET

14 Sept 63
From Brazil Cubela flew to Paris & was going to tell Castro after the fact

6/PN

AMLASH SECRET

0002281

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City Station

P28 (Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos Tepedino AMWHIP 1, a long-time friend. Cubela knew (Stewart) from Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR an elite group of leftist students organized in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & [illegible] wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex filtration called off on report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans.

(Comment:

First of 3 vague links with [illegible] & Cubela - but unknown if Cubela arrested of not in Cuba) Other two links are even more nebulous

~~15 Jan~~ 14 August 61

Message from airline stew (good friend) to Tepedino that Cubela going to Paris & wanted to talk to him under a friend of Stewart's. No indication of any meeting.

SECRET

15 June 62

Lucia Echevarria Bianchi told an asset (AMCONCERT-1) that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

21PV

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Tepedino

0002283

27 June 1962

Tepedino approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew Tepedino to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tepedino dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61, so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on reasons for defection were Chivarrias.

30 July - 3 August 62

(Wm Wainwright) met w/ Tepedino a jeweller in NYC & both went to Helsinki: Cubela talked into being recruited "in place" & not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries; kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet [illegible].

7-9 August 62

Meeting in Stockholm because Helsinki for [illegible]. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tepedino in Helsinki.

SECRET

q/pv

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cubela who had written Tepedino in NY that he didn't want to ~~continue~~.

C/A had to tell [French Govt 24 that ~~emphatic~~ were for purposes of affection. French unilaterally keeping Cubela under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy cables that Cubela insisting on meeting w/ RFK; assumed Cubela going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out U.S. support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgerald, using SAS, goes to Paris & got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cubela that U S would have no part in attempt on Castro's life.

Written record from Sandy is contrary

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states ~~Fitz~~ assumes that Cubela would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting pen w/ ~~[illegible]~~

Sandy says Cubela accepted pen but ~~stated~~ he would not take it ~~to~~

1/M/

Cuba with him- SECRET

0002287 Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK's farm. [2 high-powered rifles w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2 lbs C-4 expl.] As they left meeting heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he recd an OP im cable from Fitzgerald that everything is "off" but nothing in AMLASH file.

Cubela w/ a take S/W with him to Prague

1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba

19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tepedino had been briefed to meet Carlos Jorge ROBRENO Murgy who has message from Cubela.

??? 3 May 64 - Robreno says Cubela wanted a silencer

30 August 64

Artime recd info thru Madrid that a group of dissident members of Castro regime wanted to ~~___~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Artime sends Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artime agrees to talk to AMLASH-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Artime

0002288 SECRET

thinks if AMLASH-1 is chief of dissident group we can forget about operation
4 ~~Dec~~ 64
Sandy prepares a memo for 6570 for Artime to maintain contacts w/ dissident group's reps in Bogota. Artime does
6-7 Dec 64
Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was ~~told~~ going to continue his plans
Told U.S. could not be involved.
10 Dec 64.
Artime d/n know nor Cubela that CIA in direct contact with each. Rather SAS contrived to put ~~both~~ men together.
CIA d/n want to put silenced weapon in ~~[illegible]~~ Cubela's hands directly but could do it thru Artime-
27 Dec; 30 Dec (not time) (not time)
Cubela & Artime meet in Madrid. Artime reports to Sandy that Cubela had requested a silencer for FAL rifle but Americans w/n give him one.
Artime to come up w/ silencer or different rifle in Cuba.
11 Feb 65
Cubela to receive pistol w/ silencer & Belgian FAL rifle w/ silencer from Artime's secy. Both weapons come from ~~[illegible]~~ U.S. & are now in Madrid.

SECRET

Unprecis[illegible]

12 Feb 65 SECRET 0002289

Artime has [illegible] ... de Cubela in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source is friend of [illegible] who telephoned him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Dorvalle arrives in Madrid from Cuba & introduced to a station officer. Publicly close friend of Cubela; & claims to be in touch w/ group of military leaders planning to eliminate Castro.

Jailed in July 62 for exp. Trafficante as lawyer for Capri Hotel. Trafficante - ex manager

(Another name - [illegible])

June 1965 Victor ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former PM trainee who was terminated as a malcontent on 20 March 1961, contacted INS who [illegible] FBI on 3 June 65.

Espinosa stated he had received letter from a friend in Paris urging him to meet w/ Alberto Blanco who had a message from Cubela who wanted it delivered to CIA

Message - Cubela in a position to kill Castro & would CIA & US Govt be willing to support them. If "yes", then details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris $10,000 on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & upset -

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave him two.

0002290 Tepedino 7,100 in NYC.

SECRET

23 June 1965 headquarters sent cable terminating contact. "convincing proof that entire AMLASH group insecure"; terminate ASAP

1 March 66 - Cubela & Benin arrested for activities w CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta, Alberto Blanco Romariz, Juan Alsina Navarro. confessing

Also appearing - Guillermo Cunhill Alvarez, Angel Herrero Veliz

Gonzalez Gallarreta[03] - attaché in Spain contacted by (James Noel [awhile "cover" officer]) at US Embassy in Madrid. [32]

Cubela meets w/ Artime in Spain in Feb. 1965.

Artime sent Gallego to US to get telescopic sight & silencer. Delivered to Blanco Romariz who delivers it to Gonzalez Gallarreta then to Cubela the day before he left Madrid.

Seized in Cubela's residence were

Tasco telescopic sight, FAL rifle +.

9 March 66

Castro sends personal letter that death sentence not be asked.

10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

SECRET

Silencer did not break; I threw it away because it was burning my hands

2/IV

I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened
000229 the doors to me SECRET but I did not have
the courage to tell him
(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to Europe in late 64 & early 65 to meet w/ Artime. No mention of March at then Nov 65 contacts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out, Castro would have little of enough to anyway, & probably imprudent to execute someone in inner circle.

2 high-level interagency meetings where Castro assassination discussed

Special Group (Augmented)
10 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)
State: Dean Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwitch
White House
Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFK absent)
Defense:
McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Lansdale
CIA - McCone Harvey
USIA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson
Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrott's notes d/n mention assassination but McCone & Harvey remember McNamara ~~~~ raising it & Murrow commenting.

McCone recalls Wilson & McNamara "heartily agreed"
SECRET

Lansdale wrote memo on 13 August to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, & Wilson which

SECRET

Probably Pearson's info re a high-level mtg was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Maheu in May 67 & wrote a report:

1- Maheu briefed Morgan on Phase I

2- Never heard of Phase II from Roselli

0002293 or anyone

3. Roselli steered to Morgan by Greenspun

4- Maheu suspects Roselli a client of Morgan

5- Roselli denies hearing; Morgan in Vegas recently "in disguise"

6- Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas in March. Dr Frech [garrison wife] w/ Roselli, so was Morgan

It is Our impression that Greenspun also involved in the conversations.

p22 Point finger to Roselli as source of info and to confirm & Morgan as Pearson's source.

p23 Summer of 62 - Edwards, Maheu, & Roselli had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli he informed RFK of Roselli connection.

E of Robt Maheu reflecting not DA judgements with immediate knowledge of the Kennedy project

Pearson's story seems to rely on 2nd phase. Could be Harvey if only 1 source

Probably from 2 sources:

State Dept meeting + mob operation so Roselli chief suspect.

SECRET

Defense: Roselli drunk too much & Morgan drunk & talking to a newspaperman friend (Greenspun

Lansdale memo assigned drafting papers for various subjects related to Cuban operation. A portion excised from CIA copy of memo was "including elimination of leaders". Lansdale repeatedly tried to raise assassination of Castro w/ Harvey over next several weeks but Harvey declined.

At least 5 people in Lansdale's office knew McCone & Lansdale intent on assassination as part of it.

0002292

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room of White House.

McGeorge Bundy, Vance, McCone, Thomas Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion of Cuba

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jessup as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DD/P to DCI re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 expenses. Cuban exile; Jose Maria "Pepin" Bosch, Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He approached JMWAVE for US participation. Refused outright

19 August 64

DCI (McCone) to Bundy - re FBI interviews w/ all participants

SECRET

C0002294 ~~Publicity~~ has not run its course:

a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting

b) Garrison has not revealed full case; CIA should be prominently displayed when he does

c) Puerto Rican in custody & will be deported

Pearson story includes a detail found only in Phase ~~II~~ - the 3 man team.

---

p. 126 put in its best light - that there is no ulterior motive in spreading the story

p. 127. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this.

p. 129. Maheu reports that Trafficante in jail in Tampa. Rosselli is persona non grata in Las Vegas, being required to register with police any time he is in town. None of them would have compunctions about dragging in their CIA connection when he was pressed by law enforcement authorities. Giancana has already done it when the ~~FBI~~ was hounding him in 1963. Rosselli appears to be doing it in his conversations with Morgan & Garrison.

P 131. Speech - 3 May 1967

Commented Bob had CIA over a ~~barrel~~

SECRET

Tab A

SECRET

0002295

24 July 75 memo
Santo Trafficante

4. ST delivered poison pills to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T supported another candidate (cancelled re BofP)

- Maheu formerly contact employee w/ Office of Security -
- Roselli convictions

Nov 1967 - illegal entry
Dec 68 - Friars Club

Senate Staff 7-8 June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff
No 838-75
9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-10 Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on contingency exec action capability)

5. Who is Torvella (yet another (alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIROGUE/01 operational abuses?

- who was (WIZARD (4) (John Stein's memo)
- 2 agency officers who employed WIROGUE DDO
- Want Talk w/ John Stein & see WIROGUE file by Walt Elder

SECRET

SECRET

Memo 5 May 1967
Subj. Wm K. Harvey 0002296

MISSING

1. ~~Helms~~ Bill Harvey contacted Papich to report to Papich some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his co-op to FBI. He explained to Papich — — —

16 May 67

Tab B Attention Edward Cohen Firm Gambero de Dade Co. 7 April 77
Morgan ~~associated~~ w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Stuart Pierpont Morgan
DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain
AKA - Richard Scalzetti SS 357-22-333
1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daly Diary by Maggie Daly - rumor ~~that Assassination~~ planned earlier FO of Cuban group

1 Sept 67 [illegible] of Life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marino, a henchman of Marcello, at Las Vegas hotel. Garrison denied knowledge of Marino's connect to Marcello.

TO Chief SRS
Subj. Cain 9 Oct 1967

TAB B

Info re meeting of Fair Play under Richard Criley (# 346 116)
Source of info on Guillermo ESCOBAR who was int of Horace Speeds (SAS) leads obtained from Ralp PEREZ (44426
Speed #C 199499)
Escobar recruiting Cubans for Communist Party in Chicago.

0002297

File

7 Dec 1978 DCI for Dos of Sec'y

Roselli, Johnny

SECRET

9 August 1976

Blind memo ~~Subj~~: Johnny Roselli

0002298

Tab B & C

Additional info re Trafficante, Roselli, & Giancana contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Breckinridge re Arthur Balletti & Fred Hauser arrest

1. 12 Jan 1961 Maheu told FBI he recommended DuBois to an LA atty whom he w/n disclose

2. Atty is James Cantillon per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re conference w/ Col. Edwards who said he contacted Maheu in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out" for Giancana. Giancana gave every indication to Maheu he would attempt to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Western Hemisphere Division

Subj: Salvatore Giancana & Richard Cain

Re: Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31 Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left vice squad in 1960; Accurate Lalmatow. a P.I. firm

CIA contacts

SECRET 0002299

A. Fall 1960

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office & volunteered info on Cuban exile groups in Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohmann of Chicago Field office re a Mr. Krouganoly who was reported w/ president of Panama to investigate Communism.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staffer identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohmann from Panama offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Agency reps. Winston Scott & Warren Dean in Mexico City saying he had an investigative agency w/ branches in Chicago & LA which he used to provide training to Mexican Govt Agents

F 4 June 62

Deported from Mexico for law violations having weapons & impersonating a Mexican official & writing

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic Club & Adolphus Club by Horace Speed WH Div staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office

He would like to work overseas for CIA

Cain worked for Cook Cty Sheriff & ~~[illegible]~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago area & would provide info on undercover activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra

H. 26-30 Aug 1963

Cain info re the Student Directory, a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Mario Cordova's interest in purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRE people who had purchased arms. (Horace Speed) rec Washington & Chicago told Cain to get out of the picture

K. 1967

FBI investigating Cain's assoc w Mob & recommend CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico City; then disappeared 1 May 1972 saying he was going to Latin America. Involved in illegal arms deals (international) & on various occasions stated he was CIA

M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines ~~[illegible]~~ id. Cain as skyjacker who flew him to Honduras. 5 May 72

(IPV

SECRET

27 Nov 63 0002301

By Robt B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Crily, Secy Chicago chapter. Assassination of Pres. discussed

3. LHO purchased rifle in March 1963

Sheriff's office had not identified LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing two officers of UPI

4. Sheriff Ogilvie din like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba; If they develop anything definite they would probably inform FBI

~~Could not recall~~! "that early in 1963 the Chicoms took over operation in US for Fair Play

---

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call c/I re report Duncan used to get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Guthman but to someone in Guthman's office (Justice

SECRET

0002302

Breckenridge memo to Dept of requests

1. Persons in Sec A of paragraph 3 is contained in over 50 volumes of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarters in Section C
B1 is Artime; Also used by Mafia in Castro operation

Detectives have already interviewed [illegible] who is retired.

Tab C
1. Ramon Don Estevez Dominguez (shorty)
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas [illegible]
DOB 12 Jan 1918
3. Luciano Nieves (shorty)
4. Jose De La Torriente (shorty)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45
[illegible] nephew of [illegible] to [illegible]
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortiño DOB 10 Jan 40
7. Manuel Artime

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Meeting w/ Terry Lenzner

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Corp.

- O'Malley knew Hughes a client of Mullen's; this information picked up in course of a cordial relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Free Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan

- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt possible impact on cover placements caused consternation.

- ~~Hunt~~ approached O'Malley for an individual having leadership & superior ability skills
- Thomas C. Amato apparently offered job.

- Houston
- Early 60's intervention w/ Farrell of I&NS re possible deportation of Bracamonte
- People who knew well Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

~~1977~~ ~~Report~~

SECRET 0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use disaffected personnel in armed forces in Cuba.

Early '63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez & Enrique Cayardo Rovera developed [illegible] Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/ Jorge Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Previously USSR 1940's & then in Polish Air Force under British Command. Married a Cuban & arrived in Miami May 61.

early '63 Volsky contacts Tad Szulc & met with Goodwin & Hurwitch (State). CIA assigns plan to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK

Never progressed very far & by Sept 63 had 3 sources including [illegible]

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from AMTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was going to appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Szulc.

Had some contacts but no real action capability; In '65 [illegible] & [illegible] arrested.

Szulc & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba in 1959-60

SECRET

~~Jose~~ Ricardo RABEL Nunez

suspected agent who defected Dec 62 & joined AMTRUNK, returned to Cuba as [illegible]

X in 65 to exfiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RABEL a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibly –

AMTRUNK might have been an ingenious Cuban plan from the beginning. Only action was laying caches & some infil & exfiltration.

Mob

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Meskil,
– quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan Orta to bomb Castro. "I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US)"

Sturgis' id of Orta, prior to its disclosure by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security wrote memo in 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 1960 citing FBI reports.
(made in conjunction w/ Daily News stories)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that mob had their own plan

– Lorenz claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Varona

SECRET

000 0
0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960
- Mob support for exiles
FBI 18 Jan 1961
V receiving some of that support

Sturgis could have learned of Varona's role after Varona settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report
14 August 1964 would a statement by a person jailed in Cuba w/ Trafficante.

Other Proposals

1. May 1975
Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he was given a rifle & a mission to kill Castro.
Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re Antonio Veciana
On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, April 66 he proposed to CIA the assassination of Castro
In 1970 report he made a proposal to an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved same group of agents

SECRET

so probly same plan 0002308

1. 27 March 1961 AMBRONC/15

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with affirmative arrival on 30 March but no comment on assassination

3. 5 April 61

Only arms for 50 men; would try 9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBRONC infiltrated several times & finally executed 30 August 62 after May 62 arrest. Reported as never identifying he was CIA; & not mentioned in McCone Book

b) AMCOAX 11 ~~both~~ these persons in

c) AMPUG 11 touch w/ AMBRONC

d) AMPANIC 17 & mentioned in McCone book; Doing 38 yr sentences.

All 3 people sentenced prior to BofP & none had assassination mission. Only AMBRONC mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy] claimed he had plans for coup w/in 30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was untrue & (Moratori) unknown.

06

SECRET

2/N

SECRET

5. 3 May '61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary Recovery Movement saying they would try to kill "Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"

- Maybe AMPUG/1

Tab D

A M L A S H

- ~~Rejects~~ notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.

- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963

- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intell performer; best approach as chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

p 3-4 Summary & Findings

Book V leaves inference that Castro's speech to Dan Harker after AMLASH leak but CIA had not proposed anything at that time. & then meet until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov he was requested to delay until Fitzgerald arrived "of something interesting" AMLASH

SECRET

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

On 24 Nov. Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico,

Purpose was to determine significance LHO's contact w/ Soviets.

AMLASH 11 name was included. But in reference to contact between a member of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural attache. NOT a report of a contact between AMLASH 11 and the Soviet

"A" role - clearly did not know of AMLASH 1963 associations w/ CIA

Table E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Precautions following Assassination of Pres Kennedy.

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63
Acting on FBI request, Agency requests Alvarado be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj - WILSON, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SCO,
Subj: Jack RUBY - LHO

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780/612 (SR/CI/R)
Photo of individual closely resembling LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 3/781,841 (CI/R&A)
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 316/01446-64
VIADUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964
His Comments on 7 Photos Forwarded ~~FBI~~

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21 1978

1977 I.G. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Book V

The criticisms of the CIA are based on a series of presumptions of how various investigative leads were handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations of the intelligence agencies against Cuba should have had a negative influence on the quality of their support for the W.C. investigation.

"It seems probable .... investigation p 2

they should have .... facts .. p 7

Certainly .... information. p 7

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro had learned of these activities it would have provided him with motivation against Pres. Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the WC) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal.

SECRET

Agency views the provocation theory in the Final Report 8 pages from of " the

result of an evolution in perception.
i.e. Provocation [illegible] in 63 from both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, along with the army of US Cuban program.

"The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

Review by Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~ who knew details of 1963 & 1964 operations for the most part are no longer available. Primary reliance on records.

CIA has now conducted such a review - looking at "the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where they theoretically could have started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, altho' it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of Pres. Kennedy. The exploration sometimes became one of asking if this activity (whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination President Kennedy had

SECRET 0002314

he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored!

Tab C

AMLASH The Agency had only a tentative understanding with this man during Pres Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is described so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in this paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pres. Kennedy's death the [illegible] ~~the~~ with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could ~~[illegible]~~ learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p 14 New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Meskil in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturgis as follows:

"The third [illegible] scheme involved planting a ~~bomb in~~ Castro's office. I had

0002315

access to the Prime Minister's office,' Sturgis said. I knew Fidel's private security man Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (American embassy in Havana).

"He (Sturgis) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, altho there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late Jan 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Orta's role in this operation was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

Same news stories and one 13 June 1976 discuss a possible relationship between Sturgis and Trafficante, also naming a Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975, noting

137

SECRET 0002316

a connection between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Presume that Sturgis reported to have had a role in gambling act. On this availability due to his "lost payoffs." One could deduce that Sturgis and Ortiz could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling operations.

June 1976 Sturgis also reports claim of Marita (Marie) Lorenz that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re poison pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on Lorenz: "this seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the timing of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. IG suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own."

SECRET

In fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent

SECRET

0002317

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination, the 1967 IG Report refers to ~~two~~ FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1960, indicates support by the criminal underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 Jany 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... to late as June 64 another group for plot in Miami area for 150,000.

Speculation that when Harvey took over in April 1962 CIA officers felt "there was something already "ongoing."

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway...

In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contributions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

6020